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Conscious Perception Missing. A Reply to 
Franklin, Baars, and Ramamurthy
Pentti O. A. Haikonen
University of Illinois at Springfield
Franklin, Baars, and Ramamurthy kindly clarify their position 
in response to my critique (Haikonen 2009). I fully recognize 
the important and pioneering work that Franklin, Baars, and 
Ramamurthy have done in the field of artificial cognition and 
my critique should not be construed to diminish the value of 
that work in any way.
However, in the good tradition of philosophical debate 
I would like to point out the following. There seems to be 
nothing in the writings of FBR (or anybody else’s) that would 
explain how the running of any computer program could 
evoke qualia and subjective feelings in the executing machine. 
On the other hand, it is obvious that computer programs can 
simulate various feelings including pain and pleasure via their 
functional consequences. The presence of such consequences 
does not, however, prove that the computer would actually feel 
something or be conscious in the hard sense (h-consciousness, 
see Boltuc 2009). It may well be that the phenomenal aspects of 
consciousness are beyond the capacity of computer programs 
and may be present only in some hard-wired perceptive and 
reactive systems.
FBR have done excellent work in the development of the 
LIDA agent that they call functionally conscious. Based on that 
they wish to define functional consciousness as the process 
that implements the Global Workspace Theory and the LIDA 
Cognitive Cycle (Franklin, Baars, and Ramamurthy 2009) a 
notion that I criticized in my previous response. The concept 
“functional consciousness” is doubtful, but even so, it should 
not be hijacked to apply to one specific cognitive model only. 
In their current response FBR wish to go even further. They 
state: “There is a sizable and growing body of evidence from 
cognitive science and neuroscience that human minds (their 
control structures) implement the essential elements of Global 
Workspace Theory.” This is not a modest claim at all.
Personally I would be quite happy if it could be shown 
that my cognitive model (Haikonen 2003, 2007) had captured 
some elements of human cognition (I trust it has), but I would 
not dare to claim that the brain implements my model, even 
in the unlikely case where my model would turn out to be a 
perfect model of the brain. The human brain and mind are a 
little bit older constructions than the Global Workspace Theory 
and have evolved without any knowledge of the same. It seems 
that here FBR have switched the role of a natural object and 
its man-made model. No natural object or system is based on 
man-made models or blueprints. To claim the opposite is to 
nominate oneself as the Creator. However, we are free to find 
Nature’s principles and implement those in our own designs.
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ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF 
WEB-BASED OBJECTS
A Semantics for Virtual Environments and the 
Ontological Status of Virtual Objects
David Leech Anderson
Illinois State University
Abstract
Virtual environments engage millions of people and billions 
of dollars each year. What is the ontological status of the 
virtual objects that populate those environments? An adequate 
answer to that question requires a developed semantics for 
virtual environments. The truth-conditions must be identified 
for “tree”-sentences when uttered by speakers immersed in a 
virtual environment (VE). It will be argued that statements about 
virtual objects have truth-conditions roughly comparable to the 
verificationist conditions popular amongst some contemporary 
antirealists. This does not mean that the virtual objects lack 
ontological standing. There is an important sense in which 
virtual objects are no less real for being mind-dependent.
Introduction
What is the ontological status of the virtual objects that populate 
the burgeoning virtual worlds that reside on the Internet? 
Second Life is a virtual world comprised not only of objects 
like tables, chairs, trees, and fountains, but large landmasses 
that have cities with expansive real estate developments. The 
people who frequent this virtual environment (by animating 
virtual bodies known as “avatars”) not only prize these virtual 
objects in some Platonic way, they place a commercial value 
on them by paying cold, hard cash. Anshe Chung (a.k.a. Ailin 
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Graef) became a cause célèbre and made it on the cover of 
Business Week magazine when the value of her combined 
virtual holdings in Second Life exceeded $1,000,000.1 Not one 
million in virtual “Linden” dollars (the currency within Second 
Life), but one million dollars U.S.
World of Warcraft, with over 11 million paying monthly 
subscribers, is another massively multiplayer online role-playing 
game (MMORPG) that is played within a virtual environment. 
The virtual objects that populate games like this are bought and 
sold earning their creators hundreds of millions of dollars each 
year.2 One might begin a discussion about the ontological status 
of such virtual objects by invoking a famous claim advanced 
by Ian Hacking, a party to the realism-instrumentalism debate 
on the ontological status of theoretical entities (like electrons). 
Hacking reports on a conversation he had with a working 
physicist. He recounts:
Now how does one alter the charge on the niobium 
ball? “Well, at that stage,” said my friend, “we spray it 
with positrons to increase the charge or with electrons 
to decrease the charge.” From that day forth I’ve been 
a scientific realist. So far as I’m concerned, if you can 
spray them then they are real.3
In the same spirit, one might be tempted to say: “If you can buy 
them and sell them for hundreds of millions of dollars then they 
are real.” Even so, merely acknowledging the reality of virtual 
objects gets us no distance to understanding in what that reality 
consists. The first step must be to determine what counts as 
a “virtual object” and then we can ask where (if at all) in our 
ontological hierarchy they are properly placed.
Virtual environments and virtual objects
From the outset, the meaning of “virtual object” (VO) will 
be restricted so as to exclude some digital entities that are 
so described in discussions about Internet commerce. The 
day of Michael Jackson’s memorial service, Facebook gave 
away 800,000 copies of what was described as a “special 
commemorative virtual gift”—a graphical representation of 
Michael’s white sequined glove. In this discussion, graphical 
images like the white sequined glove will not be treated as a 
virtual object, because a Facebook page does not qualify as a 
genuine “virtual environment.” It lacks nothing in its virtuality, 
but for the purposes of this discussion it isn’t rich enough to 
constitute an environment, which will be defined as follows:
E = an environment is a dynamic space-time region (with 
a minimum of two but typically three spatial dimensions) 
populated by objects that bear spatial and temporal 
relations to one another.4
The environments which we typically inhabit are physical 
in nature.
PE = a physical environment is a dynamic space-time 
region that consists of objects that bear spatial and temporal 
relations to one another and objects whose identity 
conditions include intrinsic, non-relational properties that 
exist independent of the present cognitive states (thinking, 
believing, experiencing, etc.) of any cognitive agent.
An MMORPG also constitutes an environment. It provides 
objects to serve as the target for agents’ intentional states and a 
stage upon which human actions (buying, killing, lying, sharing, 
etc.) become intelligible and even morally evaluable. We will 
describe these environments as “virtual” and I propose that we 
define them as follows:
VE = a virtual environment is a dynamic space-time region 
that consists of objects that bear spatial and temporal 
relations to one another and whose identity conditions 
supervene on the actual (or possible) sensory and cognitive 
states of the agents who inhabit that environment.
Virtual environments are populated with virtual objects.
VO = a virtual object is an empirically detectable, 
intersubjectively stable, publically accessible entity that 
can be identified and re-identified over a sufficiently long 
run and whose identity conditions supervene on the actual 
(or possible) sensory and cognitive states of the agents 
inhabiting the associated VE.
The reader will notice that the definitions of VE and VO 
make their very existence dependent upon the cognitive agents 
who engage with them. If a plague wiped out the entire human 
race, and there no longer existed agents for whom the virtual 
tree could be an object of experience, then the tree would 
cease to exist.
An opponent will object that this consequence is 
unreasonable. Virtual environments (VE’s) need not be these 
ephemeral things that blink out of existence when the cognitive 
agents who previously inhabited them cease to exist. VO’s 
could, instead, be defined so as to be constituted by the physical 
systems that are causally responsible for generating users’ 
experiences of them. In that case, even if all humans died in a 
plague, so long as the machinery kept running, the VO’s would 
continue to exist.
Those sympathetic to this latter interpretation of VO’s 
will object that my previous definition attempts to settle, by 
stipulation, what should be a central controversy of this paper. 
This is a fair objection. I concede that my definitions of VE 
and VO do require a convincing argument—an argument that 
will be offered below. Laying these admittedly contentious 
definitions on the table at the outset will, however, streamline 
the discussion and aid in the explication of the view. In the 
end the reader must judge whether the definitions are well 
motivated.
Virtual Environments (VE’s) in the history of 
philosophy
By making virtual environments dependent upon the cognitive 
activity of the agents inhabiting them, I am quite deliberately 
invoking the idealist / antirealist philosophical traditions and the 
various alternatives they offered to a traditional realist account 
of the nature of the external world. Consider how the language 
of VE’s and PE’s might be used to describe debates over realism 
from Descartes to the present. We might recast Descartes’ 
methodological skepticism by considering the possibility that 
while I am having the experiences of a tree in the quad (VO), 
there may not exist a physical tree (PO) that answers to it. We 
could then imagine Berkeley arguing that the very concept of 
a material tree (PO) is incoherent and all that normal people 
mean when speaking of a “tree” is the tree-as-experienced 
(the VO). Michael Dummett’s “language acquisition argument” 
will translate into the claim that there is no coherent account 
of how humans could learn to understand a language with 
realist truth-conditions (which requires asserting the existence 
of PO’s) and so the correct semantics for natural languages 
must be verificationist (which requires asserting the existence 
of VO’s only).5 Finally, Hilary Putnam’s “Brains in vat” argument 
can be seen as an attempt to show that even if one begins 
with externalist assumptions, one will utterly fail in one’s 
attempt to raise the Cartesian specter of radical skepticism by 
considering the case where I am a disembodied brain floating 
in a vat of nutrients stimulated by a computer (experiencing 
VO’s but not PO’s). Ironically, knowing that I am not a brain 
in a vat does not confirm the truth of realism, according to 
Putnam.6 On the contrary, if I can’t raise the specter of radical 
skepticism—because there is no genuine possibility that I 
could be in a VE that is not being caused by a corresponding 
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PE—then the very distinction between VE’s and PE’s collapses, 
as most antirealists insist, and we are left with the incoherence 
of metaphysical realism.7
Admittedly, I am playing fast-and-loose with these august 
traditions as I reformulate them in terms of VE’s and VO’s. But 
I do hope that in spite of any quibbles one might have about 
my reading of history, the general point can still be made. 
The territory we are exploring is not unique to the twenty-
first-century world of MMORPG’s. And the decisions we make 
about the proper analysis of VE’s might conceivably speak to 
or even commit one to certain positions in much broader areas 
of philosophy.
One more comment before we progress. The reader should 
be cautioned not to conclude that embracing a verificationist 
semantics for virtual objects in any way counts against the 
truth of metaphysical realism regarding the external world. 
Quite the contrary is actually the case, or so I would argue if 
space permitted.
Ontology with semantics
Our ultimate goal is to determine the ontological status of 
virtual objects. One cannot determine the ontological status of a 
particular virtual tree, however, unless one first determines what 
the virtual tree is. But that is ultimately related to the semantic 
question, What are the truth-conditions of the sentence, 
“There is tree” when spoken about the virtual tree in the virtual 
environment? The point is not that you can ignore metaphysics 
and simply do semantics. Certainly not. The point is that reality is 
too metaphysically rich; there are simply too many realities that 
are prima facie candidates for being the referent of the virtual 
“tree” in question. Nothing will be accomplished if one gives 
the most elegant ontological account of a phenomenon that one 
takes to be a virtual tree, if everyone in your audience insists that 
the phenomenon that you analyzed is simply not a “virtual tree” 
given what everyone else means by those words. The war is 
only won if you win both the semantic battle and the ontological 
battle.There is no avoiding the semantic question. We want to 
know the ontological nature of virtual trees; but to answer that 
question, we must also learn what the truth-conditions are for 
“tree”-sentences uttered within virtual environments. It is to 
both questions that we now turn.
A slippery slope argument
When native English speakers are immersed in an MMORPG 
and utter a “tree”-statement, the language they are speaking 
(whatever language that turns out to be) we will call “V-English.” 
I have proposed that the truth-value of such “tree”-sentences is 
not sensitive to the state of any physical object and is instead 
determined solely by how things stand with respect to the 
cognitive states of the inhabitants of the game. Thus, “tree”-
sentences will be true on this account if all or most inhabitants 
of the game are having cognitive experiences constitutive of 
an “empirically detectable, intersubjectively stable, publically 
accessible” tree.
An alternative to this view is one motivated by the currently 
very popular position of semantic externalism. On one version of 
this view, a word refers to whatever it is that “causally regulates” 
the use of that term. The referent of the term is whatever it is 
that lies at the end of the causal chain that ultimately causes 
the speaker to utter sentences like, “Look, there is a tree.” For a 
speaker immersed in a particular MMORPG, there are a number 
of candidates that might fit that description. Let’s consider a few. 
Each of the numbered conditions that follow is a candidate for 
being that physical state-of-affairs that causally regulates the 
use of the term, “tree,” when uttered by a person immersed in 
a VE. When identified, that condition will be the referent for the 
term, “tree,” in V-English. The first candidate is:
1. States of the server hardware: The throwing of 
the electrical (on-off) switches on the VE-server 
that implements the “tree”-subroutine in the server 
software.
This has been a popular choice for an externalist referent 
of “tree”-statements as uttered by “brains in a vat” according to 
Putnam’s thought experiment,8 and at first blush seems equally 
promising here. The software alone is hard to target because it 
is an abstract entity, not a physical object. The switches alone, 
outside of the context provided by the “tree”-software, don’t 
capture the continuity of the tree through time. This articulation 
attempts to capture the best of both worlds, embracing both the 
server’s hardware and software. But this option is susceptible 
to a counterexample.
Assume that a bug is detected in the VE-server software 
of a famous MMORPG right in the middle of a well-publicized 
national contest being waged live and online between just two 
contestants. The two will soon be shooting (virtual) arrows into 
a tree and the bug can be expected to produce a malfunction. 
In order to prevent this eventuality, the programmer has a plan. 
The programmer knows exactly what signals (plus TCP/IP 
– Internet protocols) would be sent out over the Internet to the 
two contestants’ PC’s if the server were functioning properly. 
Imagine, as well, that the programmer has the ability (it doesn’t 
matter how) to interrupt the stream of defective instructions 
whenever they are sent by the software bug, and to send 
instead packets of instructions over the Internet that produce 
the proper “tree”-effects on the users’ computers. (Consider 
the programmers actions here on analogy with the actions of 
God in correlating the actions of minds and bodies according 
to “Occasionalist” theories of mind-body interaction.)
In this case—where the programmer is ensuring that 
inhabitants of the VE will continue to experience an “empirically 
detectable, intersubjectively stable, publically accessible” 
tree—what do we say about the truth-value of the sentence, 
“The tree was struck by an arrow” when uttered within the 
MMORPG? It seems only reasonable to say that it is true. 
The quick-thinking, spontaneous actions of the programmer 
preserved the existence of the tree within the VE. However, 
if the V-English word, “tree,” refers to condition 1. identified 
above, then the sentence must be false. Because of the software 
bug, the “tree”-routine is no longer being run. But “false” is the 
wrong result. As a matter of fact, it turns out neither hardware 
nor software is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for 
the existence of the virtual tree. Happily, the case itself suggests 
a second (PO) candidate for the referent of the word “tree”:  
2. Signals propogated over the Internet: The carrying of the 
instructions plus TCP/IP Internet protocols that propogate 
the “tree-generating” instructions sent to the personal 
computers of all agents inhabiting the VE.
The reader herself, however, can probably generate a counter-
example to this proposal. Instructions sent by TCP/IP is again just 
a half-way house. It is only a means for delivering instructions 
to the PC’s of each participating agent. There are any number 
of methods that might accomplish this, including tens of 
thousands of employees scattered around the world using all 
manner of quirky occasionalist methods for getting signals to 
all relevant computers causing the proper pixels to light up 
and forming the 3D image of a tree. So long as the result is a 
stable, intersubjectively consistent, genuinely public, virtual 
tree—“tree”-statements uttered in V-English will still come out 
true, even when condition 2. is lacking.
But now we are on a slippery slope. “Pixels lighting up on 
computer monitors around the world” is no more the proper 
“end” of the causal chain than any of the previous ones. Pick 
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any condition on the list. It is possible for that condition not to 
hold but so long as the next condition down on the list does hold, 
then the existence of the virtual tree will be preserved.
3. The hardware in every user’s PC: The aggregate throwing 
of all appropriate electrical (on-off) switches in the machine 
hardware that implements the “tree”-subroutine on all the 
personal computers of all the agents inhabiting the VE.
4. The monitor illumination in every user’s PC: The 
synchronized illumination of pixels on all the computer 
monitors of all agents so as to create an intersubjectively 
consistent 3D public tree.
5. Retinal stimulation in every user’s eyeball: The proper 
stimulation of the retinas in all agents’ eyes so as to create 
an intersubjectively consistent 3D public tree.
6. Visual cortex stimulation in every user’s brain: The 
excitation of the proper areas of the visual cortex (V1–V5) 
in all agents’ brains so as to create an intersubjectively 
consistent 3D public tree.
Each of the conditions is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
the existence of the virtual tree. It doesn’t matter how you 
accomplish the task of bringing about the conditions described 
by VE and VO. It doesn’t matter what physical system (or mental 
or spiritual system for that matter) is used along the way, all 
that matters is that you produce the final effect that literally 
constitutes the existence of the virtual tree. And that final effect 
inevitably is9:
7. The intersubjectively coordinated, conscious experience 
of all users: The proper production of an empirically 
detectable, intersubjectively stable, publically accessible 
tree that can be identified and re-identified over a sufficiently 
long run and whose identity conditions supervene on the 
sensory and cognitive states of the agents inhabiting the 
associated VE.
When typical inhabitants of a MMORPG confront a tree, and say, 
“There is a tree,” what they are talking about is best captured 
by 7.
The ontological status of virtual objects
I have just argued that the essential nature of virtual trees is 
best described not in terms of the mind-independent states of 
physical systems, but in terms that make essential reference 
to the cognitive states of human agents. One might reasonably 
use either the language of a verificationist semantics as 
embraced by some antirealists, or the language of conscious, 
first-person phenomenal states familiar from recent defenders 
of phenomenal consciousness. I have purposely used both in 
this discussion, not wanting to privilege either one. Some will 
likely find one option more congenial than the other.
I recognize that I have done nothing to answer the myriad 
objections that can quite reasonably be raised against this 
controversial position. But that work must be left to another 
time. Our final task now is to come full circle on the Hacking 
quote that opened this paper. If (by chance) I am right about 
the essential nature of virtual objects, are they real or not? Do 
we add them to our ontology, or leave them out?
Lynn Rudder Baker has, in the pages of this publication 
(Spring 200810), addressed a question that is, at least in part, 
relevant our question: Are artifacts less real than natural objects 
because they are mind-dependent? In that article, she defends 
a position with which I am completely sympathetic. She insists 
that human artifacts are in no way metaphysically deficient in 
virtue of their having been shaped and fashioned by the human 
mind. Tables are no less metaphysically “real” than are tubers. 
She says,
There is a venerable—but, I think, theoretically 
misguided—distinction in philosophy between what 
is mind-independent and what is mind-dependent. 
Anything that depends on our conventions, practices, 
or language is mind-dependent (and consequently 
downgraded by those who rest metaphysics on a mind-
independence/mind-dependence distinction)...
A second reason that the mind-independent/mind-
dependent distinction is unhelpful is that advances 
in technology have blurred the difference between 
natural objects and artifacts. For example, so-called 
“digital organisms” are computer programs that (like 
biological organisms) can mutate, reproduce, and 
compete with one another. …Are these objects…
artifacts or natural objects? Does it matter? (p.4)
I wholeheartedly affirm Rudder Baker’s sentiments here. A 
chair is not dependent upon the present cognitive activity of 
any agent. Every mind that exists in the universe could cease 
to exist and the chair would continue to exist. The chair is 
causally dependent upon the past activity of some cognitive 
agent, but so long as that past activity produced something 
with its own intrinsic properties, which is dependent upon 
no present mental activity, then it is mind-independent in the 
metaphysically relevant sense.
Those who Rudder Baker criticizes make the mistake 
of conflating two fundamentally different meanings of the 
term “mind-dependence.” The kind of mind-dependence 
attributable to artifacts which are dependent only in their causal 
origins has profoundly different ontological implications than 
the kind of mind-dependence attributable to virtual objects 
which will literally cease to exist if minds stop thinking about 
them. Treating the former as if it deserves the same ontological 
classification as the latter ignores this important distinction. That 
is why, according to my definitions, artifacts qualify as physical 
objects (PO) not virtual objects (VO).
Having said that, I would argue that Rudder Baker makes 
too sweeping a claim in her concluding two sentences of the 
paper, where she says:
No one who takes artifacts of any sort seriously, 
ontologically speaking, should suppose that 
metaphysics can be based on a distinction between 
mind-independence and mind-dependence. In any 
case, technology will continue to shrink the distinction, 
and with it, the distinction between artifacts and 
natural objects. (Ibid.)
Ironically, Rudder Baker seems to be committing the same 
conflation error as did her opponents, but in the reverse 
direction. She seems to be denying that there could be any 
ontologically significant distinction between mind-dependence 
and mind-independence. The table in my kitchen, and the 
table in my Second Life kitchen are both artifacts. But one is 
mind-dependent in a more robust sense that is ontologically 
significant. If she is denying this, then I think she makes a 
mistake similar to her opponents. In the end, I am not at all 
confident that she is denying this distinction. She may simply 
be ignoring it. But if she is denying it, then we deserve more of 
an argument than she has given thus far.
Conclusion
So what about virtual trees? Are they real? The term “real” is 
ambiguous. No, they are not real in the sense that is opposed 
to being ideal, or verificationist. They are metaphysically 
dependent upon the cognitive state of human beings, and that 
makes them “ideal” in contrast to physical trees that are “real.” 
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But more important than being “real,” in this sense, is being real 
in the sense that they “exist” in some substantive sense of that 
word. Yes, they do exist. They are real enough to make it the 
case that statements like “I left your shield next to the tree in the 
quad” and “You lied to me about the power of this sword and I 
will never be your friend again” are true. These statements are 
not about a fictional realm like that of a novel. One can commit 
real (not fictional) betrayal with a virtual sword, and a sword 
real enough to betray is real indeed.
I also believe it is reasonable to say that virtual trees exist 
and should be listed among our ontological commitments in 
something like the way that conscious states should be listed 
in one’s ontology.11 The conscious states of John’s believing 
that p and seeing an orange sunset are real. So too, the virtual 
tree that supervenes on the conscious states of many people. 
Obviously, those who deny the existence of consciousness will 
not be persuaded by this line of reasoning, but for that there is 
also the verificationist route to metaphysical legitimacy.
This discussion has only begun to explore the ontological 
status of virtual objects. It is a discussion that I hope 
continues.
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Abstract
The realism-antirealism debate in the philosophy of science 
has made its way into informatics and computer science circles 
in debates concerning the status of the entities represented in 
what informaticians call ontologies. For realists, the terms of 
these ontologies refer to real entities out there in the world; for 
antirealists, they refer to concepts in the minds of experts. In this 
paper, after an explanation of domain and formal ontologies, 
I offer some criticism of the antirealist approach and argue 
that, in spite of the antirealist sentiments that still predominate 
in informatics circles, informaticians can nonetheless feel 
comfortable in constructing domain and formal ontologies from 
a realist perspective.
Key Words: informatics, ontology, domain ontology, formal 
ontology, realism, antirealism
The Sea of Information
Informatics is the science associated with the collection, 
categorization, management, storage, processing, retrieval, and 
dissemination of data and information—principally, through the 
use of computers as well as computational and mathematical 
models—with the overall goal of improving retrieval and 
dissemination of data and information. Increasingly, many more 
traditional disciplines have their own informatics, reflecting 
the fact that they are confronted by the need to deal with large 
bodies of data and information—consider, for example, the field 
of Geographic Information Systems (http://www.gis.com/) or of 
biomedical informatics (Shortliffe & Cimino 2006).
The body of information deriving from such disciplines 
that is now being made freely available through computers 
on the Web constitutes a veritable sea of extraordinary depth 
and breadth. How can we collect, categorize, manage, store, 
process, retrieve, disseminate, mine, and query all of this data 
and information appropriately and efficiently by computational 
means?
The problem is to chart this ever-growing sea of information 
in such a way that its various parts can be efficiently accessed, 
used, navigated, and reasoned about by human individuals. 
How can we ensure that the terminology, definitions, relations 
that are used when storing information and data (a) accurately 
reflect the developing state of knowledge in a particular domain 
or discipline, (b) are internally coherent, (c) are clearly defined, 
and (d) are interoperable from one database to the next?
Here, it is especially (d) that poses problems. Researchers 
in different disciplines speak different languages, use different 
terminologies, and format the results of their research in different 
ways. The situation is not unlike that of the Biblical Tower of 
Babel, where there is an uncontrolled and unsurveyable 
multiplicity of different languages and little in the way of cross-
linguistic understanding. Because bodies of data are insulated 
from each other in this way, interoperability, shareability, and 
reusability of data and information is greatly limited. The result 
is a silo effect: data and information are isolated in multiple, 
incompatible silos. And it is to address the silo problem, 
philosophers, computer scientists, and informaticians in various 
domains have worked to create what are known as domain 
ontologies in their respective fields of study.
